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ABSTRACT
USF completed a research study in 2005, which prioritized the replacement of 85
deteriorating composite precast deck panel bridges. This thesis re-evaluates the original
recommendations in the wake of failures of two of these bridges in 2007. Since funding
will not allow all identified bridges to be replaced, it was necessary to determine the most
effective repair methods. To assess USF’s recommendations, a forensic study was
undertaken in which the most current inspection and work program documents on the two
failed bridges were reviewed and FDOT personnel interviewed. The best repair
procedures were determined by reviewing repair plans, specifications, reports and site
visits. The study found the two bridges that failed had been correctly prioritized by USF
(No. 1 of 18 and No. 8 of 15). A new, accelerated repair method encompassing complete
bay replacement was developed in a pilot project funded by the Florida Department of
Transportation.

vi

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1

Introduction
The use of composite precast deck panel slabs on bridges was initially

implemented in the construction of highway bridges in Illinois in the early 1950’s. This
innovation was never part of the bridge design process but rather the result of value
engineering during the construction phase. The precast deck panel was used as a stay-inplace form and a cast-in-place (CIP) component was placed on top and in between the
panels as shown in Figure 1.1, which considerably reduced construction time. By
implementing this method, field forming was only needed for the exterior girder
overhangs.

Figure 1.1 Composite Deck- Precast Deck Panel and CIP Concrete
In the early to mid 2000s, Florida had approximately 200 precast deck panel
bridges, with the majority of them, 127 being located in Districts 1 and 7; this is
1

including 18 on the Leroy Selmon Crosstown Expressway (Crosstown Expressway) of
the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) (see Figure 1.2) [1]. Precast panel
sizes vary with girder spacing but are typically 10 ft. x 10 ft. in plan and 3½ in. to 4 in.
thick. In design, it is assumed that the panel acts compositely with the CIP reinforced
concrete slab for resisting live loads as shown in Figures 1.3 and 1.4.

Figure 1.2 Precast Deck Panel Inventory in 2000

Figure 1.3 Precast Deck Panel with CIP Component

2

Figure 1.4 Precast Deck Panel Reinforcement Details
Despite successful performance in other states and satisfactory performance in
other FDOT districts, precast deck panel bridges have a long history of premature
deterioration in Districts 1 and 7 that has resulted in excessive maintenance for the FDOT
and impacts to the traveling public. Previous research has attributed this to contractors
using flexible fiberboard bearing material supports to simplify construction [2].
The FDOT Districts 1 and 7 Structures Maintenance Office (DSMO) has
responded to numerous maintenance problems on precast deck panel bridges throughout
the I-75 corridor in southwest Florida. Initially, the response was reactionary, geared
towards emergency situations in which a localized failure of the bridge deck resulted in
lane closures. Between 2000 and 2003, five failures occurred. Over time, the DSMO
began a proactive approach to monitoring, early detection and repair to avoid disruptive
emergency situations.
The DSMO had established a method to systematically replace selected precast
deck panel bridges on I-75 in both Districts 1 and 7 with full depth, CIP concrete decks.
The short-term goal was to replace the decks on bridges with high average daily traffic
(ADT) and the long-term plans were to replace the decks on all precast deck panel
bridges in both districts. The FDOT had allocated $78 million in 2001 for a period of 10

3

years to replace deck panel bridges on I-75 running through Districts 1 and 7, and $65
million in 2003 for the Crosstown Expressway Viaduct Bridges.
In 2005 The University of South Florida (USF) completed a comprehensive study
for FDOT. The objective of the study was to prevent any further failures by identifying
and prioritizing deck replacement of high risk bridges in Districts 1 and 7.
However, since finalization of the study, two subsequent sudden bridge deck
failures have taken place. Both failures occurred in 2007 within District 7: the first one
on the Crosstown Expressway and the other on I-75.
1.2

Objectives
The purpose of this research is to (1) reassess the prioritizations assigned to the

two bridges that experienced deck failures subsequent to the finalization of the 2005 USF
Study, (2) to provide an update of current status of composite precast deck panel bridges
in FDOT’s Districts 1 and 7, and (3) assess the effectiveness of repair methods used on
this type of deck system.
This was accomplished by participating in the emergency response teams for both
subsequent failures, gathering information, such as bridge inspection reports, monthly
(deck panel) inspection reports, special engineering reports, plans, funding reports, 5Year Work Program report and construction status reports from the FDOT as well as
meeting with key FDOT, consultant and contractor personnel.

4

1.3

Thesis Organization
This report is organized into seven chapters and two appendices that describe

various components of the research. Chapter 2 presents a literature review on other
studies that have been published on composite precast deck panel bridges. Chapter 3
provides details of the deck failures that occurred in 2007. Chapter 4 assesses the recent
failures in comparison to USF’s rankings. Chapter 5 gives an update on the current status
of composite precast deck panel bridges Districts 1 and 7. Chapter 6 assesses the
effectiveness of the repair procedures used on composite deck panel bridges and the
summary and conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.

5

2. BACKGROUND
2.1

Prior Research
Research related to the deficiencies of composite precast deck panel bridges has

been undertaken since as early as 1982. A brief description of the research in
chronological order is as follows:
2.2

University of Florida Study (1982)
In 1982, The University of Florida Study by Callis, et al. [2] was performed as a

result of the excessive deck cracking on the Peace River Bridge. It concluded that:


The decks in their present cracked condition are structurally adequate to carry
normal traffic. In spite of the simple action of the decks, flexural stresses are
not excessive.



The shear stresses in the Peace River Bridge are substantially higher than that
of conventional bridge decks or panel bridges with positive bearing at the ends
of panels. The increase in shear stress is brought about by the combination of
the lack of bearing of or the end of the panels and the loss of bond on the end
of the panels which is primarily due to creep of the panels under the action of
the prestress.



The observed cracking on the top of the deck is probably primarily due to the
volume changes brought about by the differential shrinkage between panels
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and CIP component. However, temperature changes and live load stresses
certainly increase the tensile stresses and the degree of cracking.


Adding extra transverse or longitudinal steel is not felt to be sufficient to
ensure adequate fatigue life of panel bridges.



Removing the fiberboard and replacing it with a material providing positive
bearing (mortar) would greatly increase the fatigue life expectancy of the
Peace River Bridge. Whether this action is economically justifiable depends
on further studies of the shear fatigue behavior of the bridge.



Future panel construction projects should include a detail that provides
positive bearing for panels. Strand extensions may also be useful.

2.3

University of Florida Study (1983)
In 1983, The University of Florida study by Fagundo, et al. [3] was a follow up to

the Peace River Bridge Study, with the objectives to evaluate the potential for shear
fatigue failure of existing panel bridges constructed using details that did not provide
positive bearing under the ends of the panels and to compare the performance of
composite precast deck panel bridges constructed using several support details against the
performance of conventional reinforced concrete decks. The report concluded that:


Composite decks without positive bearing act as simply supported beams with
maximum positive moment in the center and negative moment at the ends.



Replacing fiberboard with grout would reduce shear stresses at ends.



Panel decks with positive bearing should have a service life comparable to
conventional decks.

7

2.4

University of Florida Study (1984)
In 1984, the third report on this subject from The University of Florida was

authored by Fagundo, et al. [4] with the objective of developing an immediate
management plan that would allow FDOT to decide upon a reasonable, not necessarily
optimum, program for grouting and repairing the bridge decks. The report concluded that:


Bridges in which reasonable bond is maintained between the ends of the
panels and the CIP component concrete should not exhibit any significant
longitudinal spalling. Thus many of the panel bridges should not exhibit any
significant longitudinal spalling for a very long service life.



It is known that the major factors that cause the loss of bond on the end of
panels are: poor end treatment of the panel such as sawing, lack of strand
extensions, creep of the panels after the deck is poured, shrinkage of the deck,
and live load stresses after the deck is placed. However, it is impossible to
predict for any given bridge the probability of loss of bond and the associated
spalling.



Bridges that exhibit longitudinal spalling can be repaired by the M1 procedure
which includes grouting under the panel. Once the repaired these bridges
should have normal service lives.



Panel bridges with reduced longitudinal steel, particularly those with longer
panel pans (girder spacing) have the potential for transverse spalling.



Transverse spalls that occur can be repaired by the M2 procedure as modified
in Chapter 4, and should restore the deck to the extent that it would give a
long service life.
8

Furthermore, the study recommended that:


No large scale grouting or repair of panel bridges that have not exhibited any
significant spalling is recommended. This is based on the expectation that the
majority of the panel bridges will not exhibit significant spalling during their
service life.



If any M1 or M2 repairs are made in a bridge span, that span should be
thoroughly surveyed for delamination by the chain procedure and all areas
that are suspected of being damaged should be repaired. Also, bearing should
be restored to all panels within that span.



If a damaged bridge contains multiple spans, than all spans should be
thoroughly investigated for delaminating. If significant delaminations appear
then serious consideration should be given to repairing all damaged areas on
the bridge. Further, any span that is repaired by either M1 or M2 procedures
should be grouted under all panels. This recommendation is based on the fact
that construction costs and inconvenience to the traveling public would be
greater if a bridge is repaired one span at a time rather than all spans
simultaneously.



Data on bridges that are repaired should be carefully kept both with regards to
physical variables and costs. Thus, after a few years an empirical prediction
can be made of future costs.



Field testing as part of research already planned should be directed towards
verification of the repair techniques under field conditions. Attention should
be given to testing spans with varying amount of longitudinal reinforcement.

9



The management plan for the panel bridges outlined in steps 1 through 5
should be reasonably cost effective based on the present state of knowledge.
To develop a truly optimum management plan a comprehensive research
program extending over several years is required.



It suggested that the M1 and M2 repair methods be incorporated with the
modification described in section 4.2. These modifications should improve the
ductility, strength, and durability of the repaired area.

2.5

University of South Florida Study (2005)
In 2005, The University of South Florida performed a study by Sen, et al. [5] with

the objective of examining the deterioration process that leads to sudden failures in
composite precast deck panel bridges and in turn to develop a strategy to assist the FDOT
in the prioritization for replacement of these bridges in Districts 1 and 7 to avoid such
failures. This study is reviewed more thoroughly because one objective of the author’s
research is to reassess the recommendations of the USF Study.
The USF study analyzed five localized failures that occurred in composite precast
deck panel bridges in Districts 1 and 7 between 2000 and 2003. Table 2.1 summarizes
relevant information relating to these failures. As indicated in the table, all failures had
some type of repair while some had a combination of repairs.

All the failures were

narrowed down to only two cities within the two districts, Sarasota and Tampa. A survey
was also conducted to determine the performance of deck panel bridges in other districts.
No failures had occurred in Districts 2, 3, 5 and 6. District 4 reported failures in two
bridges: Bridge No. 940126, carrying I-95 (Southbound) over the Florida Turnpike and
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Bridge No. 940127, I-95 (Northbound) over the Florida Turnpike but no details were
provided.
All failures occurred in bridges where the deck was nominally 7 inches thick. No
failures occurred in deck panel bridges with thicker slabs. The percentage of trucks in the
ADT varied between 8 and 30%.
Table 2.1 Localized Deck Failures 2000 to 2003
District
Bridge
No.

170146

170086

170085

100332

100332

Year Built

Bridge
Location

Failure
Date

1

1981

Sarasota,
I‐75 NB
Over Bee
Ridge Rd

2/12/2000

1
Sarasota,
I‐75 NB
Over
Clark Rd
1
Sarasota,
I‐75 SB
Over
Clark Rd
7
Tampa,
Cross‐
town
Viaduct
WB Span
38
7
Tampa,
Cross‐
town
Viaduct
WB Span
70

Age at
Failure
(Years)

19

20

20

(Good)

(Good)

22

(Fair)

180
days

210
days

2
days

5

23

(Fair)

0

2

5

1980

9/5/2003

90
days

7

1980

10/2/2002

(Sat)

ADT

%Truck

Failure
Size
(In.)

Loc. in
Panel

Comment

18 x 24

Edge or
Corner?

Failure at
asphalt
patch
within full
depth
spall
repair

36 x 60

Corner
Support

Localized
full depth
CIP repair

18 x 18

Corner

Asphalt
patch
adjacent
to M1
repair

48 x 30

Near
corner

Asphalt
Patch

Edge

Failed M1
repair
with
flexible
patch
material

34,000

7

1980
12/20/2000

Days
Since
Last
Insp.

6

1980
11/27/2000

NBI
Rating
Before
Failure

Rain
7
Days
Prior
to
Fail
(in.)

23
days

11

10%

34,000

0.68

9%

4

34,000

0.2

10%

2

23,000

0.55

8%

3

23,000

1.1

8%

24 x 36

All failures occurred under the wheel loads applied close to the face of the girders
where initial longitudinal cracks developed. Also in all five cases, the failure occurred in
the right lane, (i.e. slow lane), where large and heavier loads (i.e. eighteen wheeler trucks
and permit vehicles) generally travel. Failure was normally in the edge or corner panels
whose boundaries developed reflective longitudinal and transverse cracking.
A deterioration model based on the field observations and analysis of localized
failures was developed in the study (see Figure 2.1). However, as the structural behavior
of composite precast deck panel bridges depends on several factors, not all of which can
be quantified, it makes it almost impossible to accurately predict future service life using
numerical analysis. On the other hand, inspection data that tracks progression of cracking
can be more successful in predicting localized failure.

Initial Condition

Longitudinal Crack

New Spall/
Spall Increase
M1 Cracking and
Adjacent Spall Increase

Parallel Longitudinal
Crack (Shear)

M1 Repair

First Spall

Parallel Longitudinal Cracking
Adjacent to M1 Repair

Adjacent
Spall Patch

Additional Adjacent
Spall Patching

Spall Increase/
Spall Patching
Walking Spalls
Adjacent to M1 Repair
Localized Deck
Failure

Figure 2.1 Deterioration Model
The simplified model indicates that longitudinal cracks first develop along the
girder lines. This is followed by occasional reflective transverse cracking. Such defects
appear within 5 years of construction. These cracks may not change for nearly 10 years
after which there is more widespread transverse cracking. Longitudinal and transverse
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cracking result in spalling and delamination that require repair. This is an important stage
in the deterioration process because the type and quality of repair will dictate if the longterm performance of the bridge is satisfactory or poor. In most cases, such damage occurs
in regions where the panel is improperly supported on fiberboard bearing material. Where
deck repairs are combined with proper panel bearing (e.g., by placing non-shrink grout or
injecting epoxy), repairs are satisfactory. Where this is not carried out, and repairs are
limited to surface repairs, there is progressive degradation as shown in Figure 2.1, which
can lead to failure. In several instances, failures occurred at locations where temporary
repairs had not been replaced.
Simplified calculations performed in the USF study proved that punching failures
could result at loads below the design wheel load. This assumed the CIP deck to provide
no resistance and the panel to be supported on fiberboard bearing material with well
developed cracking along the transverse and longitudinal panel boundaries. The failure
load was calculated to be around 15 kips. Otherwise, failure loads were nearly four times
higher.
Equipped with this information, the USF team created replacement prioritization
for bridges in District 1, District 7 and the Crosstown Expressway, respectively (See
Tables A.1-A.5).
2.6

Summary and Conclusions
Various studies have been conducted on the problems with composite precast

deck panel bridges. One such study was completed by USF in 2005. It investigated the
five failures occurring in Districts 1 and 7 between 2000 and 2003, with the goal of

13

prioritizing high risk bridges for replacement and consequently to eliminate sudden
failures in the future.

14

3. DECK FAILURES IN 2007
3.1

Introduction
The main objective of the USF Study was to prioritize high risk bridges for

replacement and in turn eliminate further sudden failures. However, since finalization of
the study in 2005, two subsequent failures have take place. Both failures occurred in
2007 and within District 7. Details of the subsequent failures are provided in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Localized Deck Failures Following USF Study
District
Bridge
No.

100332

100436

Bridge
Location

7
Tampa,
Cross‐
town
Viaduct
WB Span
39
7
I‐75 over
E.
Broadway
Ave., CR
574 and
CSX
Railroad

Year Built

Failure Date

Age at
Failure
(Years)

1980

3/5/2007

Days
Since
Last
Insp.

5

27

1983

9/11/2007

NBI
Rating
Before
Failure

Rain
7
Days
Prior
to
Fail
(in.)

565
(Fair)

(Fair)

%Trucks

Failure
Size
(Inches)

Loc. in
Panel

Comment

Edge

Failed
localized
patch
repair

Edge

Failed
localized
patch
repair

23,000

0.21

5

24

ADT

8%

18 x 8

46,250

685

15

0.54

8%

12 x 24

3.2

Bridge No. 100332
The first failure occurred on March 5, 2007, on Bridge No. 100332, The

Crosstown Expressway (Westbound) Viaduct, Span 39, Lane 2 (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2),
The failure size was approximately 18 in. x 8 in. hole through the deck and it occurred
within the outside edges of a nearly 5 ft. x 7 ft. existing repair patch. It was located on the
edge of the panel and the edge of the beam.

Figure 3.1 Bridge No. 100332, Span 39 Failure (Deck Top)
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Figure 3.2 Bridge No. 100332, Span 39 Failure (Deck Underside)
Bridge No. 100332 is a 91 span (67 spans with precast deck panels) structure
carrying the Crosstown Expressway westbound with two 12 ft. lanes and a 8 ft. wide
right shoulder and 4 ft. wide left shoulder. The average daily traffic (ADT) in 2007 was
23,000, with 8% truck traffic. The superstructure consists of AASHTO Type III
prestressed concrete beams. The failure happened on Span 39, which is approximately 55
ft. – 1½ in. long, and the beams are spaced at 8 ft. -1 ¼ in. supporting a typical 7 in. thick
composite deck.
The last biennial inspection report prior to the failure was finalized August 17,
2005, 565 days before failure, and assigned the deck an NBI Rating of 5 (fair) [6]. The
report makes general statements applying to all precast deck panel spans stating that the
17

deck top has light to moderate wear and is typically populated with minor cracks. Also
that the deck top and deck undersides have minor multi-directional cracking in isolated
locations and some of the deck top cracks have minor associated spalls. It noted that on
some of the deck underside many cracks have light efflorescence. The report also
indicated that there are minor delaminations in isolated locations up to 1.5 ft. x 3 in.
along the construction joints.
More specific details on deficiencies were acquired from the monthly deck panel
inspection reports [7] indicating that longitudinal cracks were sealed in October 2006.
Some new spalls developed at the edge of an existing repair in the south wheel path of
Lane 2 in January 2007. The spalls increased to high priority in the February report
indicating there is a 2 ft. x 2 ft. x 2 in. spall with delamination on the topside of the deck
and another of the same size on the deck underside. These deficiencies progressed into a
punch through failure occurring on March 5, 2007, consisting of an 18 in. x 8 in. hole,
which had to be addressed with an emergency repair applying full depth bay replacement
across two panels (see Figure 3.3) [8].
The failure occurred after a heavy rainfall event [9]. The precipitation according
to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) archives was 0.21 in.
seven days prior to the failure.

18

Figure 3.3 Excerpts from Emergency Inspection Report
3.3

Bridge No. 100436
The next failure took place on September 11, 2007, on Br. 100436, I-75

(Northbound) over E. Broadway Ave., CR 574 and CSX Railroad, in Span 4, Lane 3 (See
Figures 3.4 and 3.5). The failure was approximately 12 in. x 24 in. and was located inside
an existing repair patch, on the edge of the panel as indicated in the emergency inspection
report in Figure 3.6 [10]. Like its predecessor, the failure was also located on the edge of
the panel and the edge of the beam.
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Figure 3.4 Bridge No. 100436, Span 4 Failure (Deck Top)

Figure 3.5 Bridge No. 100436, Span 4 Failure (Deck Underside)
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Figure 3.6 Excerpt from Emergency Inspection Report
Bridge No. 100436 is a five span structure carrying I-75 Northbound with three
12’ Lanes and 10’ shoulders on both, right and left sides, The average daily traffic (ADT)
in 2007 was 46,250, with 8% truck traffic. The superstructure consists of AASHTO Type
II, III and IV beams. The failure happened on Span 4, which is approximately 76 ft. in
length and is comprised of Type III beams, spaced at 8 ft.-10 in., supporting a typical 7
in. thick composite deck.
The last biennial inspection report prior to the failure was finalized October 27,
2005, 685 days before failure, which assigned the deck an NBI Rating of 5 (fair) [11].
The report documented that there are numerous patches made with “epoxy type” material
in the deck top, longitudinal cracking with maximum widths of 1/16 in. over the edge of
beam lines and transverse cracks up to 12 ft. long x 1/8 in. wide over the precast deck
panel joints in all spans. It stated that most transverse cracks are spaced 8 ft. apart, which
is the approximate length of a deck panel on this bridge. Due to the problem with
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excessive cracking throughout the bridge, a deck cracking diagram was prepared for the
inspection files as shown in Figure 3.7 [12].

Figure 3.7 Bridge No. 100436, Transverse Cracking Pattern
The monthly inspection reports indicate that localized repairs were made in Span
4 in April, July and September of 2005 and in February of 2007. The reports also indicate
that there is a problem with transverse cracking throughout the bridge. Most of the
cracking is 1/8 in. wide but three cracks in particular were identified with an approximate
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width of ¼ in. [13]. The reports indicate that the three ¼ in. cracks have been present
since August of 2006 as shown in Figure 3.8.

Figure 3.8 Bridge No. 100436, Span 4 Failure (3/4 in. Transverse Crack)
The precipitation was 0.54 in. seven days prior to the failure according to the
NOAA archives.
3.4

Summary and Conclusions
The USF Study’s goal was to prioritize high risk bridges for replacement and in

order to eliminate any additional sudden failures in the future. However, since
finalization of the study in 2005, two bridges experienced sudden failures. The failures
took place on Bridge No. 100332, Crosstown Expressway Viaduct, Span 39 and Bridge
No. 100436, I-75 over E. Broadway Ave., CR 574 and CSX Railroad. Both failures
occurred in 2007 and were located in District 7. Both failures were inside the limits of
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existing repairs, were located on the edge of the precast panel, and edge of beam and
occurred after rain events.
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4. ASSESSMENT OF USF PRIORITIZATION RELATIVE TO NEW FAILURES
4.1

Bridge No. 100332
The USF study had ranked this bridge as No. 1 for replacement on the Crosstown

prioritization listing as shown in Table A.5. First priority replacement ranking was given
to this bridge because it ranked the highest in the categories of Failing Repair Count,
Weighted Index, FDOT Ranking, ADT, Importance, Normalized, Risk and Safety as
quantified below:


Year Built: 1975



Spall Count: 344.7



Failing Repair Count: 44.9



Weighted Index: 1018.7



FDOT Rank: 1



ADT: 23,000



Importance Rank: 1



Normalized Risk: 1.000



Risk Rank: 1



Safety Rank: 1

However, despite being ranked with highest replacement priority on the
Crosstown Expressway, the FDOT was unable to acquire all the funding required to
replace the bridge decks in time to avoid the failure. It is because this bridge was
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programmed for deck replacement along with its twin structure, Bridge No. 100333,
Crosstown Expressway (Eastbound), which makes a total of 134 precast deck panel spans
to be replaced. The large number of spans to be replaced required considerably more time
to obtain funding than the typical three span bridges on I-75. Replacement funding in the
amount of $65 million had been programmed in 2003 for this project [14]. This amount
was approved for use in 2009 and the deck replacement project was advertised and four
design build firms were shortlisted on March 12, 2010. However, it is currently on hold
because The Tampa-Hillsborough Expressway Authority (THEA) requested that the
bridges also be widened along with deck replacement [15]. Although widening was given
as an option in FDOT’s request for proposal, the additional $65 million required for this
work was not initially programmed. Consequently the project is at this time on hold and
THEA is trying to obtain “stimulus funding” from the Federal Government to include the
additional work. The FDOT is expecting to select a firm from the four shortlisted parties
in early 2011 and begin work by midsummer.
Taking all of this information into account, USF’s replacement prioritization for
Bridge No. 100332 was very accurate. It was justified in being ranked No. 1. Had the
FDOT been able to acquire the replacement funding for this bridge earlier, the failure
might have been avoided.
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4.2

Bridge No. 100436
The USF Study had ranked this bridge as No. 8 for replacement. The following

factors were taken into consideration for ranking:


Year Built: 1983



Spall Count: 5.5



Failing Repair Count: 1



Weighted Index: 17



USF Inspection Condition: Acceptable



FDOT Rank: 7



ADT: 44,500



Normalized Risk: 0.142



Safety Rank: 9



Importance Rank: 6



Risk Rank: 8

The main reason why this bridge was not prioritized higher for replacement at the
time of the study was because it only had one failing repair. The research team concluded
that the very low count of failing repairs was a good indication that the bridge would not
fail [16]. However, immediately after the study was finalized four repairs failed
consecutively leading up to the date of deck failure as noted in the monthly inspection
reports.
The FDOT was not able to perform emergency repairs using the DSMO’s
preferred method of full depth bay replacement with CIP concrete because, due to the high
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ADT on I-75, the lanes could not be closed to traffic to allow the concrete to cure as
required. Instead, the DSMO instructed their asset maintenance contractor to temporarily
fasten a ¾ in. thick steel plate with anchor bolts on the deck top over the failure as shown
in Figure 4.1. Then timber bracing was installed in the bays underneath to prevent beams
from torsion (see Figure 4.2). A few days later, the steel plate was removed and replaced
with high strength, fast setting concrete repair material. This repair was performed within
a few hours during a night time lane closure [17].

Figure 4.1 Bridge No. 100436, Span 4 Failure (Temporary Steel Plate)
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Figure 4.2 Bridge No. 100436, Span 4 Failure (Timber Bracing)
Approximately eleven months after the failure, on August 19, 2009, DSMO’s
monthly inspection of deck panel bridges cited significant deflection and deterioration in
the repair patch material (see Figure 4.3). Asset maintenance personnel were summoned
onsite, and it was agreed by all parties that an immediate repair was required. The lane
once again had to be temporarily closed to traffic for a few hours. The deteriorated patch
was removed and replaced with sound material and additional timber bracing was
installed in both north and south directions of the existing shoring between the beams
[18].
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Figure 4.3 Bridge No. 100436, Span 4 (Failure in Patch Repair Material)
USF had ranked Bridge No. 100436 No. 8 out of 15 in priority for replacement.
The main reason for not ranking this bridge higher provided by the USF research team
was because it had only one failing spall repair. However, it is evident that six of the
seven bridges ranked for replacement ahead of this bridge had no failing repairs. The
same six also had a lower Weighted Index. Six bridges ranked lesser in priority in FDOT
Rank, Safety Rank, Normalized Risk, Safety Rank, Importance Rank and had and lower
ADTs.
According to the Cracking Diagram in Figure 3.7, the transverse cracking pattern
appears to be consistent with spacing of the precast panels.

Apparently lack of

longitudinal continuity between precast deck panels resulted in the transverse cracks
propagating in the “component” or CIP concrete portion. These cracks prevent the deck
system from behaving compositely resulting in reduced punching shear capacity as
supported by the punching shear calculations performed in the USF Study. If the precast
panel support is poor due to the fiberboard bearing material, then the punching shear is
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resisted by only two sides. In this case, depending on factors like overload and material
properties, the punching shear failure of the panel becomes possible.
Considering that ranking categories of Bridge No. 100436 were higher in priority
than the six other bridges ranked before it and discovering that this bridge had a prevalent
problem with transverse cracking, it is determined that it would probably have been more
accurate to rank this bridge at replacement priority No. 2, before the other six bridges.
However, since Bridge No. 100436 was on the replacement prioritization list and ranked
approximately midway between the 15 bridges on that list, it is the author’s judgment that
USF’s ranking was on target.
4.3

Summary and Conclusions
The USF prioritization for replacement of Bridge No. 100332 was accurate and

totally justified in being ranked No. 1.
The prioritization of Bridge No. 100436 was also on target. It was on the
replacement prioritization list and ranked No. 8, approximately midway between the 15
bridges on that list.
The USF Study replacement rankings for both bridges that subsequently failed in
2007, Bridge Nos. 100332 and 100436 were justifiable.
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5. PRESENT STATUS OF PRECAST DECK PANEL BRIDGE REPLACEMENT
5.1

Status
Utilizing the $78 million acquired in 2001along with implementing strategies

such as including deck replacement within interstate widening projects, FDOT has been
working vigorously on replacing the existing composite precast deck panel systems on
bridges in Districts 1 and 7 with CIP concrete decks. At this point, the decks of 51
bridges in both districts combined have been replaced with CIP concrete decks. The
majority of the funding by far was consumed in District 1 [19]. The breakdown is as
follows:


District 1- bridges carrying or over I-75: 36



District 7- bridges carrying I-75: 9



Crosstown Expressway Bridges: 6

The FDOT has shortlisted four design build firms for deck panel replacement on
Crosstown viaduct bridges. The contract is pending final selection and execution, which
is expected to happen sometime in early 2011 and work should begin before the end of
the year. However, due to the limited availability of funding and the current condition of
the state’s economy, the remaining deck panel bridges in both, Districts 1 and 7, will
have to be addressed with repairs until additional funding, if any, can be acquired for
complete deck replacement. Currently three precast deck panel bridges that were on
District 7’s Work Program since 2000, Bridge Nos. 100468, 100469 and 100470, were
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moved from the district’s planning category of “deck replacement” to “deck repairs.” In
addition, two more precast deck panel bridges, Bridge Nos.100358, 100359, have been
added to the work program for deck repair as well [20]. Along with the lack of funding,
deck replacement on high ADT highways such as I -75 is no longer feasible due to the
volume of traffic backup that is created as a result of closing lanes. District 7’s lane
closure policy justifies closing lanes based on traffic counts. If the traffic count is too
high as the case on I-75, the district will not allow any lane closures for planned projects.
For this reason it is imperative to research the repair and rehabilitation methods to
address precast deck panel bridge deficiencies and determine the effectiveness of each
application.
The USF Study recommended replacement prioritization tables for District 1,
District 7 and the Crosstown Expressway. Replacement rankings were provided for
bridges that needed replacement as well as for bridges in good condition. As part of this
research, the tables have been updated with current information regarding NBI condition
rating and replacement status.
Table 5.1

Recommended District 1 Bridge Replacement Sequence

No.

Bridge ID
#

Current Condition NBI
Rating

1
2

130090
130112

I-275 NB Over I-75
I-275 SB R to I-75 NB &
I-75 And I-275 Ramps

N.A.
5 (Fair)

3

170081

I-75 Over Palmer Blvd

N.A.

Yes
Noremoved
from
program
Yes

4
5

170080
030188

I-75 Over Main A Canal
I-75 over CR-846

N.A.
Information unavailable

Yes
N.A.

Location
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Replaced

Table 5.1 (Continued)
6
7
8
9

170094
170099
170089
170100

I-75 NB Over Havana Road
SR-681 SB Over CSX RR
I-75 Over River Road/Cr 777
SR-681 NB Over CSX RR

N.A.
6 (Satisfactory)
N.A.
7 (Good)

Yes
No
Yes
No

10

010064

Oil Well Road Over I-75

6 (Satisfactory)

No

11

030187

I-75 Over CR-846

N.A.

12
13

170096
170079

I-75 SB Over Jacaranda Blvd
I-75 Over Main A Canal

Information
unavailable
N.A.
N.A.
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Yes
Yes

Table 5.2

No. Bridge ID#

District 1 Bridges in Good Condition

Location

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10059
10065
10066
10067
10068
10075
10090
10091
120085

I-75 Over CR-776
Airport Rd Over I-75
CR-768 Over I-75
US-17 Over Florida St.
US-17 Over Florida St.
Carmalite St. Over I-75
US-17 Over Lavilla St. & Rr
US-17 Over Lavilla St. & Rr
US-41 Over Imperial River

10
11

120086
120088

US-41 Over Imperial River
SR-685 Over Matanzas Pass

12

120114

Slater Rd. Over I-75

13

120126

I-75 NB Over Alico Rd./Canal

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

120127
130085
130089
130107
170082
170083
170084
170090
170091
170092
170093
170095

I-75 SB Over Alico Rd./Canal
I-75 NB Over SR-64
Erie Rd Over I-75
Mendoza Rd Over I-75
I-75 Over Palmer Blvd.
I-75 SB Over SR-780
I-75 NB Over SR-780
I-75 Over River Rd.
I-75 SB Over Jackson Rd.
I-75 NB Over Jackson Rd.
I-75 Over SR-80
I-75 NB Over Jacaranda Blvd.
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Current
Condition NBI
Rating
N.A.
7 (Good)
7 (Good)
6 (Satisfactory)
6 (Satisfactory)
6 (Satisfactory)
6 (Satisfactory)
6 (Satisfactory)
7 (Good)
Information
unavailable
6 (Satisfactory)
6 (Satisfactory)
Information
unavailable
Information
unavailable
N.A.
6 (Satisfactory)
7 (Good)
N.A.
7 (Good)
7 (Good)
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.

Replaced
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
N.A.
No
No- moved
out to 2020
N.A.
N.A.
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Table 5.3
No.

Bridge
ID#

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

100468
100347
100470
100358
100359
150122
100346

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

100436
100338
100357
100356
100080
100081
100049
100351

Recommended District 7 Bridge Replacement Sequence
Location
I-75 SB Over Woodberry Rd.
I-75 NB Over SR-674
I-75 SB Over CSX RR
I-75 SB Over Alafia River
I-75 NB Over Alafia River
I-275 NB Over 5th Ave. North
I-75 SB Over SR-674
I-75 NB Over Broadway/CR-574
/ CSX RR
US-41 Over Mackay Bay
I-75 NB Over Riverview Drive
I-75 SB Over Riverview Drive
SR 60 WB Over Bypass Canal
SR 60 EB Over Bypass Canal
US-41Over Palm River
Valroy Road Over I-75
Table 5.4

No.

Bridge
ID#

1
2
3
4
5

100398
100339
100377
100399
100424

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

100435
100469
100471
150121
150145
150146
150168
150169
150170

Current NBI
Rating

Replaced

6 (Satisfactory)
N.A.
6 (Satisfactory)
5 (Fair)
5 (Fair)
7 (Good)
N.A.
5 (Fair)

No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No

5 (Fair)
5 (Fair)
5 (Fair)
5 (Fair)
5 (Fair)
7 (Good)
5 (Fair)

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

District 7 Bridges in Good Condition
Location

I-75 NB Over Sligh Ave./Ramp
D-1
US 301 Over Bypass Canal
Gibsonton Dr. Over I-75
SR 582 WB Over Bypass Canal
Ramp B Over US 92
I-75 SB Over
Broadway/CR574/CSX RR
I-75 NB Over Woodberry Rd.
I-75 Over CSX RR
I-275 SB Over 5th Ave
I-375 WB Over CR-689
I-375 EB Over CR-689
I-175 WB Over 6th St. S
I-175 EB Over 6th St. S
8th St. S. Over I-175
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Current NBI
Rating
7 (Good)

Replaced

6 (Satisfactory)
5 (Fair)
6 (Satisfactory)
7 (Good)
6 (Satisfactory)

No
No
No
No
No

6 (Satisfactory)
6 (Satisfactory)
7 (Good)

No
No
No

7 (Good)
7 (Good)
7 (Good)
7 (Good)
5 (Fair)

No
No
No
No
No

No

Table 5.5 Recommended Crosstown Expressway Replacement Sequence

Bridge ID
No.
#

Location

1

100332

2

100333

SR 618 WB Over Hills River/
Downtown TPA
SR 618 EB Over Hills River/
Downtown TPA

3
4

100443
100453

SR618 Over Ramp D & SR585/22nd
Street & R/R
SR 618 Over 50th Street (US 41)

5

100448

SR 618 Over CSX RR

6
7
8

100451
100447
100457

SR 618 Over 39th Street
SR 618 Over RR
SR 618 Over Maydell Drive

9
10
11

100449
100454
100456

12
13

100444
100455

SR 618 Over 34th Street & Creek
SR 618 Over 50th Street (US 41)
SR 618 Over CSX R/R
SR 618 Over SR 585 22nd St/CSX
RR
SR 618 Over CSX RR

14

100450

SR 618 Over 34th Street & Creek

15

100452

SR 618 Over 39th Street

16
17

100446
100458

SR 618 Over 26th Street
SR 618 Over Maydell Drive

18

100445

SR 618 Over 26th Street
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Current
Condition
NBI Rating
5 (Fair)
6
(Satisfactory)
4 (Poor)
Structurally
Deficient
N.A.
Removed to
accommodate
new elevated
bridge.
6
(Satisfactory)
7 (Good)
N.A.
6
(Satisfactory)
N.A.
N.A.
6
(Satisfactory)
N.A.
Replaced to
accommodate
new elevated
bridge.
Removed to
accommodate
new elevated
bridge.
6
(Satisfactory)
N.A.
6
(Satisfactory)

Replaced
Scheduled
in 2011
Scheduled
in 2011
No

Yes
N.A.

No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
N.A.

N.A.

No
Yes
No

5.2

Summary and Conclusions
At this point, the decks of 51 bridges in both districts combined have been

replaced with CIP concrete decks. The majority of the funding was consumed in District
1, followed by District 7, then the Crosstown Expressway. However due to budget
restrictions, aside from three bridges on the work program for replacement, the remaining
composite precast deck panel bridges will have to be addressed with rehabilitation.
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6. BRIDGE DECK REPAIR METHODS
6.1

Introduction
As stated in the previous chapter, because of the difficulty in acquiring funding

due to the sluggish condition of the state and national economy at this time, the remaining
deck panel bridges in both, Districts 1 and 7, will have to be addressed with rehabilitation
rather than replacement as originally planned.
6.2

Repair Materials
Repair material and method of construction can make the difference between a

good and poor repair. Therefore, prior to proceeding with the repair procedures it is
crucial to discuss some relevant issues regarding repair materials. Repair material
selection is not an easy task because there are too many material manufacturing
companies and even more so of products to select from. The information provided by the
manufacturers and distributors is incomplete or in worse cases misleading. Additionally,
new materials as well as new repair methods are constantly introduced and changes are
frequently being applied to tried and true products.
A good source for guidance on selecting a repair material is The American
Concrete Institute’s 546.3R-06, Guide for the Selection of Materials for the Repair of
Concrete [21]. This publication was written with the goal to provide guidance on
common repair material, emphasize relevant repair material properties, test procedures,
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minimum performance levels and applications for requirements and service
environments.
The first step of the process is to perform an in-depth inspection of the problem in
the field and to document the deficiencies, potential damage and damage cause. This is
followed by an assessment of repair service conditions, repair objectives, desired service
life and future maintenance.
The following are the most important repair material properties [22] along with
the relationship of repair material (R) to concrete substrate (C) [23] listed in descending
order:
1. Drying Shrinkage

R<C

2. Tensile Strength

R>C

3. Modulus of Elasticity

R<C

4. Tensile Strain Capacity

R>C

5. Thermal Expansion/Contraction R<C
6. Creep

R>C

7. Compressive Strength

R=C

Volume stability i.e., dry shrinkage, refers to the dimensional change of the repair
material. The existing concrete, or substrate, is almost always stable and if the repair is
not, high shear stresses occur at the interface that can lead to debonding, cracking and
ultimately failure of the repair. Dry shrinkage is arguably the most important property for
a durable repair.
Another important property is the tensile strength. This is the maximum unit
stress a repair material is capable of resisting under axial tension.
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The modulus of elasticity is the ratio of normal stress to corresponding strain for
tensile or compressive stress below the proportional limit of the material. If the repair is
not structural, then it is preferable that the repair material has a lower modulus of
elasticity than the substrate. However, if the repair is structural, then the repair material
should have a modulus of elasticity as close as possible to the substrate’s property.
The tensile strain capacity is the concrete’s resistance of cracking from slow rates
of stress development under uniaxial tension. Investigation shows that the tensile strain
capacity of concrete is a relatively independent parameter. [24].
The coefficient of thermal expansion is the change in linear dimension per unit
length of a material per degree of temperature change. In situations where temperature is
not controlled, such as in exterior and some interior applications, it is desirable for the
repair material to have a coefficient of thermal expansion similar to that of the substrate
concrete so that the two materials behave similarly under daily and seasonal temperature
variations. If the coefficients vary significantly, the differential movements due to
temperature fluctuations could affect the performance of the repair, and should be
accounted for in the repair design.
Creep is time-dependent deformation due to sustained load. Because many repairs
are not subjected to significant compressive forces, compressive creep may not be a
significant property of repair materials. Creep can be important if stress is induced in the
repair material due to restraint of shrinkage strains or due to factors such as thermal
movement or the application of live loads.
Compressive strength is the measured maximum resistance of a material to axial
compressive loading, expressed as force per unit cross-sectional area. This is the property
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that most material manufacturers and distributers like to tout with high numbers.
However, a high compressive strength does not mean anything if the repair patch is
separating from its substrate concrete due to shrinkage.
6.3

Repair Types
The DSMO uses seven fundamental repair methods used to address the

deficiencies on precast deck panel bridges. Table 6.1 categorizes the repairs with their
positive and negative aspects, indicating the stage of the deterioration model in which
they are generally implemented along with an overall assessment on the effectiveness of
the repairs.

Table 6.1

Repair Methods

Repair Types

Favorable
Characteristics

Unfavorable Characteristics

Crack Repair

Helps keep out
debris and
impurities that may
accelerate
deterioration.
Easy to place
without much
disruption to traffic.
Very inexpensive
repair.
Provides a repair
with compressive
strength in
comparison to the
maintenance
patching with
asphalt.

Maintenance
Spall
Patching
(Asphalt)
Localized
Spall Repair

Used at
Stage of
Deterioration
model

Effectiveness
of Repair

Does not impede the
deterioration process or help
structurally.

1,3

Not effective

Only for temporary use If left
longer than a week, could be
detriment rather than a
benefit to the bridge.

4,6,9,11,12

Not effective

Due to the nature of the deck
panel system not acting
compositely, the localized
repairs start separating at the
edges and new spalls
described as “walking spalls”.

4,6,9,11, 13

Not effective
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Table 6.1 (Continued)
Grout
Packing

M1 Repair

Full Span M1
Repair with
Grout
Packing
Full Depth
Bay
Replacement

Good to slow down
deterioration
process by providing
positive bearing and
extending bridge
life. No traffic
impact.
Repair replaces
deteriorated CIP
component by
extending to the top
of the precast
panel.
Last longer than any
other type aside
from full depth bay
replacement.
Addresses the root
cause of problem:
elimination of
vertical and
longitudinal
separation between
the precast deck
panel and CIP
surfaces.

Does not mitigate deficiencies
that were present prior to
grout packing.

2 thru 10

Good to slow
down
deterioration

Can separate from panel, start
separating at the edges and
new walking spalls start to
appear. Process is moderately
labor intensive and impacts
traffic.
Process is labor intensive and
causes impacts to traffic.

7

Better than
spall repair
but not very
effective

7

Effective

Costly, very labor intensive
and causes significant impacts
to the traveling public.

8 thru 13

Very effective

A more detailed write up on the repairs presented in Table 6.1 is provided in
Appendix B.
Assessment of the prevailing repair procedures tabulated above indicates that
crack repair, maintenance spall patching and localized spall repair are not effective
because they do not mitigate the deterioration process caused by the panel and CIP
sections not behaving compositely. Grout packing is a good method to slow down
deterioration by providing positive bearing. However, if it is not applied at an early stage
the deterioration that existed on the bridge will continue to intensify. Both M1 and M1
with grout packing are acceptable repair procedures, but as seen in the deterioration
model, these repairs eventually start to weaken because there is still a separation between
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the precast panel and the cast in place section. Full depth bay replacement with CIP
concrete is the most effective repair method because it addresses the root cause of the
deterioration by eliminating the vertical and longitudinal interface between the precast
deck panel and CIP concrete surfaces and provides positive bearing for the deck.
Even though full depth bay replacement is the most effective repair, it is difficult
to apply this method to high ADT highways due to the extended lane closures required to
accommodate concrete curing time, as was the case on the emergency repair for Bridge
No. 100436, I-75 over E. Broadway Ave. and CSX Railroad. Therefore, the deficiency
was temporarily repaired and shored in September 2007 and a repair project was
programmed to start construction in late 2009.
The DSMO tasked Parsons Brinckerhoff (PB) to design a pilot project to replace
the deficient bays on Bridge No. 100435 and 100436, twin bridges on I-75 that would
minimize disruption to traffic. Traffic analysis and lane closure calculations indicated that
this area of I-75 should only have nighttime lane closures due to high ADT conditions.
Therefore the author, as PB’s design project manager, teamed with SDR Engineering,
Inc. to design the partial deck replacement using full depth precast deck panels to achieve
the DMSO’s goal [25]. The design detailed that the existing deteriorated deck be cut,
demolished, removed and replaced with a full depth precast concrete deck only at
night. This limitation required partial installation of sections of the full depth precast
panel per night. It was specified that a minimum length of 30 ft. of full depth panel was to
be installed per night. Near surface mounted (NSM) Carbon Polymer Reinforced Fiber
(CFRP) bars were installed to transfer shear into the existing deck. The construction was
executed during the second quarter of 2010 and although similar technology has been
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used in other states e.g., Issa [26], it was the first time that this method was applied in
Florida. It is also innovative being that this is the only method of full depth precast
panels that transfers forces longitudinally employing the use of NSM CFRP bars, rather
than transversely. For this reason the design for this pilot project was closely monitored
and scrutinized by the DSMO as well as FDOT’s State Structures Design Office in
Tallahassee.
Key repair illustrations from the design plans are shown in Figure 6.1 and a more
detailed description of the project is as follows.

Figure 6.1 Full Depth Precast Panel Design Plan Details [25]
The full depth 6,000 psi Class IV precast concrete panels were cast in a
prestressing yard and brought on to the site nightly as needed for construction.
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The existing composite precast and CIP deck was sawcut, from the inside face of
beam to the inside face of beam with an additional six inches on both sides. A platform
was constructed under the bay for containment and subsequent disposal of debris. An
overhead crane was used for the removal of the cut out existing section (see Figure 6.2)
as well as for the placement of the new full depth precast concrete panel section as shown
in Figure. A "strong back" system was used to suspend the precast panel from designed
pick-up points the top as shown in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.2 Existing Deck Cut and Removal Using Strong Back
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Figure 6.3 New Deck Suspension Using Strong Back
The process started by cleaning the edges of the top flanges of the beams with
light sandblasting. After sandblasting, potable water was applied to surfaces of top
flanges and vertical faces of existing deck slab to obtain a "saturated surface-dry"
condition prior to grouting of the longitudinal joints.
While the new panel is still suspended in place using the strong back, low
pressure grout pumps were used to ensure full penetration of the epoxy grout below the
edges of the panel to form proper seating as shown in Figure 6.4. The epoxy is kept in
place between the top of beam and bottom of panel using backer rods, also shown in
Figure 6.4. The epoxy was later placed on the panel and panel interface (i.e., transverse
edges) of the previously installed full-depth panel section and the new section of panel to
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be installed. The new section of the full depth panel was pushed in place to form and seal
the construction joint.

Figure 6.4 Installing Backer Rod for Pouring Epoxy and Finished Epoxy Joint for
Bonding New Panel with Existing as well as Seating for New Panel
On the spans with AASHTO Type II Prestressed Concrete Beams, the shear
connectors had to be cut and removed in order to fit the new precast panels into place and
to ensure that the panels have proper bearing on the beams. Therefore, to transfer shear
from the deck into the beams, adhesive bonded anchors were installed through preformed
holes in the precast concrete panel slabs as shown in Figure 6.5. Holes with specific
diameters were drilled using a rotary hammer drill and bit into the beams for placement
of the adhesive anchors. It was specified to use a metal detector specifically designed for
locating steel in concrete to avoid conflicts with the beams existing steel reinforcement.
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Core drilling was performed to clear existing steel reinforcement. Next, the holes were
cleaned using oil-free compressed air to remove loose particles accumulated from
drilling.

Figure 6.5 Adhesive Anchors
The anchors were installed and adequate quantities of the adhesive bonding
material were used to fill the drilled hole to approximately 1/4 inch of the concrete
surface measured after placement of the steel bar or anchor.
Grooves, approximately 3 ft. long were cut on both sides of the panel
transversely, and extended 3 ft. into the existing deck. These were for the installation of
the Near-Surface Mounted (NSM) CFRP Bars. The use of CFRP bars are required for
flexural strengthening in the negative moment regions of the bridge deck.
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All grooves, where the NSM CFRP bars were to be placed were half-filled with
embedding paste.

It was specified to avoid entrapped air voids between concrete

substrate and the embedding paste.
The CFRP bars were cut to the specified length, cleaned and placed into the half
filled groove and slightly pressed to force the paste to flow around the bar, completely
filling the space between the bar and the sides of the groove. The groove was then filled
with more paste until the surface leveled as shown in Figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.6 Sawcutting Grooves into Deck and Placing CFRP Rods in Epoxy
The CFRP system was allowed to cure then a protective coating was applied on
the surface of the CFRP system.
Limited planning and grooving of the new panel was required to match the finish
and grade of the existing bridge deck.
The pilot construction project was successful by resulting in a sound repair with
no disruption to daytime traffic. Lane closures were performed only during night and 30
lineal feet of the bay was replaced per night. A total of 8,831 ft. of bay replacement was
performed using full depth precast panels, 2,944 ft. on Bridge No. 100435 and 5,887 ft.
on Br. No. 100436. Deck following project completion is shown in Figure 6.7.

Figure 6.7 Completed Deck (Transverse and Longitudinal NSM CFRP
Installation)
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6.4

Summary and Conclusions
Being that the remaining composite precast deck panel bridges will have to be

addressed with rehabilitation in lieu of replacement, this chapter reviewed the
effectiveness of seven repair methods. Currently the most effective method is full depth
bay replacement with CIP concrete. If it is not possible to implement this method due to
budget constraints, then grout packing should be used to replace the fiber board bearing
material with non-shrink grout or epoxy provide to positive bearing to slow down the
deterioration process. However, if conventional full depth bay replacement is not feasible
due to traffic restrictions, then the favorable method of rehabilitation is the use of full
depth precast panels.
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Precast deck panel bridges since the mid 1980s have been experiencing premature
deterioration in Florida, which has been a great source of inconvenience to the FDOT in
regards to time, money and impact to the traveling public. Five sudden deck failures
occurred in Districts 1 and 7 between 2000 and 2003 as documented in Table 2.1.
In 2005 USF completed a comprehensive study for the FDOT. The main goal of
the study was identifying and prioritizing deck replacement of high risk bridges in
Districts 1 and 7, primarily to prevent the occurrence of similar failures. However, since
finalization of the study in 2005, two subsequent failures have taken place.
The objectives of this research were to reassess the prioritizations of USF Study
regarding the two subsequent failures, provide an update on the status of the composite
precast deck panel bridges in Districts 1 and 7 and assess the effectiveness of repair
methods used for this type of bridge deck system.
The sudden failures took place on Bridge No. 100332, Crosstown Expressway
Viaduct, Span 39 and Bridge No. 100436, I-75 over E. Broadway Ave., CR 574 and CSX
Railroad. Both failures occurred in 2007 and were located in District 7 as shown in Table
3.1.
Bridge No. 100332 was ranked as the No. 1 priority for replacement on the
Crosstown prioritization list as indicated in Table A.5. First priority replacement ranking
was given to this bridge because it Ranked No. 1 in the categories of Safety, Risk,
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Normalized Risk, Importance, ADT, FDOT Ranking, Weighted Index, Failing Repair
Count, and Spall Count.
However, despite being assigned with highest priority for replacement on the
Crosstown Expressway, the FDOT was unable to acquire the large amount of funding
required for deck replacement in time to avoid the 2007 failure. Hence, the USF
prioritization for replacement of Bridge No. 100332 was very accurate, and absolutely
justified in being ranked No. 1. Had the FDOT been able to acquire the replacement
funding for this bridge in time the failure might have been avoided.
Bridge No. 100436 was ranked as No. 8 for replacement. The USF Study Team’s
primary motive for not prioritizing this bridge higher for replacement at the time of the
study was because it only had one failing repair. However, as exhibited by the monthly
inspection reports, the repairs began deteriorating rapidly immediately after the study was
finalized and continued until failure.
Six of the seven bridges ranked for replacement ahead of this bridge had no
failing repairs. The same six also had a lower Weighted Index. Six bridges ranked lesser in
priority in FDOT Rank, Safety Rank, Normalized Risk, Safety Rank, Importance Rank
and had and lower ADTs. This bridge also began showing signs of widespread transverse
cracking since the early 2000s. Most of the transverse cracking pattern appears to be
consistent with spacing of the precast panels. They are 1/8 in. width but three had grown
to a ¾ in. width over time.
Considering that ranking categories of Bridge No. 100436 were higher in priority
than the six other bridges ranked ahead of it and discovering that this bridge had a
prevalent problem with transverse cracking [20], it is determined that this bridge could
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probably have been more accurately ranked at replacement priority No. 2, prior to the six
other bridges. However, since Bridge No. 100436 was on the replacement prioritization
list and ranked No. 8, approximately midway between the 15 bridges on that list, it is the
author’s judgment that USF’s ranking was justifiable.
In summary, the USF Study’s replacement rankings for the bridges that
subsequently failed in 2007, Bridge Nos. 100332 and 100436 were well-founded.
Since completion of the USF Study in 2005, a total of 51 composite precast deck
panel bridges in Districts 1 and 7 have been replaced with full depth CIP decks. The
majority of the funding went to District 1, followed by District 7 and the Crosstown
Expressway as indicated in the following breakdown:


District 1- bridges carrying or over I-75: 36



District 7- bridges carrying I-75: 9



Crosstown Expressway Bridges: 6

Three additional bridges are in District 1’s work program to be replaced between
now and 2020. However, due to the limited availability of funding and the current
condition of the state’s economy, the remaining interstate and high ADT highway deck
panel bridges will have to be addressed with rehabilitation until additional funding, if
any, can be acquired for complete deck replacement. The remaining high ADT bridges
are as follows:


District 1: 25



District 7: 27



Crosstown Expressway: 10
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For this reason, research was performed on the repair methods used for precast
deck panel bridge deficiencies to determine the effectiveness of each application.
The repair method and materials play a big part in the performance and service
life of the deck. Deck repairs are suitable when good concrete repair material and
construction methods are applied. Where this is not carried out there is progressive
degradation as indicated in the deterioration model shown in Figure 2.1, which can lead
to punch through failure of the deck. This was the case in all seven failures where asphalt
patching was used for repair.
The effectiveness of seven repair methods was examined. Currently the most
effective permanent repair for deck panel bridge deficiencies is full depth bay
replacement. If full depth replacement is not possible due to traffic or budget constraints,
then grout packing should be used to replace the fiber board bearing material with nonshrink grout or epoxy to provide positive bearing in order to slow down the deterioration
process until the full depth bay replacement or entire span replacement can be
accomplished. The conventional full depth bay replacement is not always feasible due to
restrictions such as not being able to close down lanes on high ADT highways. In this
case it was found that the favorable method of construction for bay replacement was the
use of full depth precast panels. The DSMO performed a pilot construction project
employing this method on Bridge No. 100435 and 100436 earlier in the year. Lane
closures were performed only during night and 30 lineal feet of the bay was replaced per
night. The project ended successfully by providing a sound repair, consisting of 8831 ft.
of bay replacement using full depth precast panels. This was done without disrupting any
daytime traffic.
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APPENDIX A (Continued)
Table A.1

Recommended District 1 Bridge Replacement Sequence
No. Bridge No.

Location

1
2

130090
130112

3

170081

I-275 NB Over I-75
I-275 SB R to I-75 NB &
I-75 And I-275 Ramps
I-75 Over Palmer Blvd

4
5
6

170080
030188
170094

I-75 Over Main A Canal
I-75 over CR-846
I-75 NB Over Havana Road

7
8
9

170099
170089
170100

SR-681 SB Over CSX RR
I-75 Over River Road/Cr 777
SR-681 NB Over CSX RR

10

010064

Oil Well Road Over I-75

11
12
13

030187
170096
170079

I-75 Over CR-846
I-75 SB Over Jacaranda Blvd
I-75 Over Main A Canal
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APPENDIX A (Continued)
Table A.2

District 1 Bridges in Good Condition

No. Bridge No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

10059
10065
10066
10067
10068
10075
10090
10091
120085
120086
120088
120114
120126
120127
130085
130089
130107
170082
170083
170084
170090
170091
170092
170093
170095

Location
I-75 Over CR-776
Airport Rd Over I-75
CR-768 Over I-75
US-17 Over Florida St.
US-17 Over Florida St.
Carmalite St. Over I-75
US-17 Over Lavilla St. & Rr
US-17 Over Lavilla St. & Rr
US-41 Over Imperial River
US-41 Over Imperial River
SR-685 Over Matanzas Pass
Slater Rd. Over I-75
I-75 NB Over Alico Rd./Canal
I-75 SB Over Alico Rd./Canal
I-75 NB Over SR-64
Erie Rd Over I-75
Mendoza Rd Over I-75
I-75 Over Palmer Blvd.
I-75 SB Over SR-780
I-75 NB Over SR-780
I-75 Over River Rd.
I-75 SB Over Jackson Rd.
I-75 NB Over Jackson Rd.
I-75 Over SR-80
I-75 NB Over Jacaranda Blvd.
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APPENDIX A (Continued)
Table A.3

Recommended District 7 Bridge Replacement Sequence

No.

Bridge No.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

100468
100347
100470
100358
100359
150122
100346

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

100436
100338
100357
100356
100080
100081
100049
100351

Table A.4

Location
I-75 SB Over Woodberry Rd.
I-75 NB Over SR-674
I-75 SB Over CSX RR
I-75 SB Over Alafia River
I-75 NB Over Alafia River
I-275 NB Over 5th Ave. North
I-75 SB Over SR-674
I-75 NB Over Broadway/CR-574 /
CSX RR
US-41 Over Mackay Bay
I-75 NB Over Riverview Drive
I-75 SB Over Riverview Drive
SR 60 WB Over Bypass Canal
SR 60 EB Over Bypass Canal
US-41Over Palm River
Valroy Road Over I-75

District 7 Bridges in Good Condition

No.

Bridge No.

Location

1

100398

I-75 NB Over Sligh Ave./Ramp D-1

2
3

100339
100377

US 301 Over Tampa Bypass Canal
Gibsonton Dr. Over I-75

4

100399

SR 582 WB Over Bypass Canal

5
6

100424
100435

Ramp B Over US 92
I-75 SB Over Broadway/CR574/CSX

7
8

100469
100471

I-75 NB Over Woodberry Rd.
I-75 Over CSX RR

9
10

150121
150145

I-275 SB Over 5th Ave
I-375 WB Over CR-689

11
12

150146
150168

I-375 EB Over CR-689
I-175 WB Over 6th St. S

13
14

150169
150170

I-175 EB Over 6th St. S
8th St. S Over I-175
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APPENDIX A (Continued)
Table A.5

No.

Recommended Crosstown Expressway Replacement Sequence
Bridge No.

1

100332

2

100333

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

100443
100453
100448
100451
100447
100457
100449
100454
100456
100444
100455
100450
100452
100446
100458
100445

Location
SR 618 WB Over Hills River/ Downtown
TPA
SR 618 EB Over Hills River/ Downtown
TPA
SR618 Over Ramp D & SR585/22nd Street
& R/R
SR 618 Over 50th Street (US 41)
SR 618 Over CSX RR
SR 618 Over 39th Street
SR 618 Over RR
SR 618 Over Maydell Drive
SR 618 Over 34th Street & Creek
SR 618 Over 50th Street (US 41)
SR 618 Over CSX R/R
SR 618 Over SR 585 22nd St/CSX RR
SR 618 Over CSX RR
SR 618 Over 34th Street & Creek
SR 618 Over 39th Street
SR 618 Over 26th Street
SR 618 Over Maydell Drive
SR 618 Over 26th Street
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APPENDIX B: REPAIR METHODS
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APPENDIX B (Continued)
B.1

Crack Repair
The USF study reported that at the second stage of the deterioration model is the

occurrence of longitudinal cracks over the edges of the girders. This type of cracking
starts early in precast deck panel bridges and is the most common type of cracking. This
crack is mainly the result of creep induced by prestressing forces in the precast panel, and
the differential shrinkage between the CIP concrete and the deck precast panel. Once the
formation of longitudinal cracking has started, sporadic transverse cracks can also
develop in the deck.
The cracking can be repaired with epoxy crack injection or crack sealant. Crack
injection is a structural repair meaning that it ideally restores the structural strength of the
deck to original. Crack sealing penetrates and covers the cracking in order to avoid water,
chlorides and other impurities from entering inside the deck [B.1]. If it is determined that
the crack is active, (i.e., opening and closing), then epoxy crack injection should not be
used because it does not have the flexibility like crack sealant.
The transverse cracks on Bridge No. 100436 were sealed using a flexible sealant
following the first failure on September 11, 2007.
B.2

Maintenance Spall Patching
After the occurrence of the second parallel crack, the concrete trapped between

the two cracks is already internally cracked and starts to crumble. During the fourth stage
of the deterioration model, a spall develops. At this stage, a new parameter is introduced,
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APPENDIX B (Continued)
the effect of the rainwater forced inside the cracks by vehicles. Although this is difficult
to quantify, bridge inspectors have observed this phenomenon over the years.
FDOT classifies deck patching in three different categories based upon depth
[B.2]:


Type A- Above the top layer of reinforcing steel



Type B- At least one inch below the top layer of reinforcing



Type C- Full depth replacement

The most common and simplest repair method is maintenance spall patching. It is
used for spalls that are in the CIP portion of the deck. When a deficiency such as a spall
would appear on the bridge deck (approximately ten years after construction as indicated
in the simplified deck deterioration process depicted in Figure 2.1), it was common
practice for the FDOT maintenance crews to patch it with flexible (i.e., “cold patch”)
asphaltic concrete as illustrated in Figure B.1.

Figure B.1

Bridge No. 100332, Span 38- Asphalt Patch (2 Days Before Failure)
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APPENDIX B (Continued)
The asphaltic concrete patching is not labor intensive for the crews and can be
performed in a matter of minutes with very minimal disruption to the traveling public. It
is also a very inexpensive procedure. The maintenance crews would set up a temporary
lane closure(s) as needed, clean debris out of the spall using hand tools and patch it using
a ready mix bag. The purpose of asphalt patching was to alleviate immediate danger to
the motoring public as well as to avoid the spall from getting worse. This method of
repair was never meant as a permanent solution, and although it was always the DSMO’s
policy for the maintenance crew to return within a week and perform a permanent repair,
sometimes due to other priorities of the crews, these temporary patches would remain for
a longer periods of time [B.3]. This type of patch for extended periods of time has proved
to be a detriment rather than a benefit to the bridge. This is especially the case when
asphalt is used in steps 11 and 12 of the deterioration model, (i.e., when used to patch
spalls inside or adjacent to a deficient M1 Repair). Instead of distributing the load evenly,
when the flexible material, which has negligible compressive strength, was placed in the
spall it would pound at the precast panel beneath it and the adjacent CIP section at its
sides. In most cases this type of pounding action leads to an increase in the area and depth
of the spalls and in some cases has led to cracking of the precast panel due to punching
shear. In the absolute worst case scenarios, asphalt was used to repair existing repairs in
the deck and the pounding resulted in punching a hole through the deck as shown in
Figure B.2. In most of the punch through failures, rainy weather had been a catalyst.
Water manages to find its way into the patched spall. Water is an incompressible fluid,
even more so than the incompressible properties of asphalt. The wheel loading on the
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patch causes pumping action between the asphalt and the precast panel until failure.
Although there is no solid proof, it is strongly believed that this is a major cause of punch
through failure in the deck. Six of the seven failures in Tables 1 and 5 occurred after
rainfall.

Figure B.2

Bridge No. 100332, Span 38- Asphalt Patch (Failure)

Additionally, as indicated in Tables 2.1 and 3.1, six out of the seven failures had
asphalt repairs. Four were standalone asphalt patches and two were asphalt patches used
to address deficiencies within existing repairs.
B.3

Localized Spall Repair
Unlike the maintenance spall patch, localized spall repairs are theoretically a

permanent type of repair. It is classified by FDOT as Type B or C. This repair method is
the immediate follow-up step to the maintenance spall patch for the maintenance crews. It
is mainly used for deficiencies that lie within the depth of the CIP portion of the deck, but
they have also been used for full depth repair. These repairs are performed using a con68
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crete repair material. This repair method is not so labor intensive, can be done at a
relatively low cost, and when using high strength fast setting material, it can be
performed using nighttime lane closures, reducing major impacts on the traveling public.
Since bridge deck repair usually involves closing lane(s), the material most often
used is some type of rapid-setting concrete repair material. Most brands of this material
usually attain 4000 psi in 4 hours.
Although this is a permanent repair, the FDOT has not had much success with the
longevity of these repairs. Due to the nature of the deck panel system not acting
compositely, the localized repairs start separating at the edges and new spalls described
as “walking spalls” start appearing in front of these repairs (see Figure B.3).

Spall
Patched
ll

New

Figure B.3

Patched Spalls and Walking Spalls

Depending on all the associated factors, new spalls can appear in the areas
adjacent to the repaired spall after some time. After the spall is created, the residual shear
capacity of that region is almost zero, even after it has been patched. Therefore, the shear
that was to be supported by that region now has to be redistributed to sections adjacent to
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the spall. This creates additional stresses in that region, and accelerates its deterioration
generating new spalls, which are also generally treated with flexible repair material (see
Figure B.4).

Figure B.4

Localized Spall Repair Starting to Spall at the Edge

One of the seven failures reported in Tables 2.1 and 3.1 occurred at an area which
had been repaired by localized full depth spall patching.
B.4

Grout Packing
The majority of deck panel bridges in Florida have been built with fiberboard

bearing material or what is commonly referred to as “roofing felt” to support the precast
deck panels on the girders. By use of this Fiberboard bearing material, positive bearing is
not provided at the ends of the precast panel. Due to the effects of creep and shrinkage,
the initial separation and longitudinal crack indicated in Deterioration Stage No. 2 is
inherent to precast deck panel construction. However, the few bridges in Florida that had
used positive bearing have performed much better and in turn have had longer service
lives. The most important conclusion drawn from the forensic study in the 2005 USF re70
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port is that the lack of positive panel bearing is clearly the main factor responsible for the
occurrence of major deck deterioration such as cracking, delamination, spalling, failing
repairs, and in the worst case localized punch-through deck failures. Hence, grout
packing is a good method of repair. The fiber board bearing material is replaced with
non-shrink Portland cement grout or epoxy grout to provide positive bearing, (see Figure
B.5).
Deck Top

Panel

Panel

Replace Fiber Board w/ Grout

Replace Fiber Board w/ Grout

Figure B.5 Bearing Detail after Grout Packing Repair
Grout packing is one of the most effective repair methods used to extend the
service lives of precast deck panel bridges. It is very cost effective in comparison to other
effective repair methods and it does not cause any interruption in traffic to the facility
carried by the structure because the work can be performed utilizing a bucket truck or
scissor lift underneath the bridge.
It is important to note that none of the failures reported in Tables 2.1and 3.1 were
retrofitted with grout packing.
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B.5

M1 Repair
Generally, after several patch and re-patches, an M1 repair is done in the affected

area. The M1 repair is used to repair longitudinal spalling along the edge of a beam as
illustrated in Figure B.6. The M1 and M2 were FDOT’s recommended methods of repair
in the 1980s [B.4].

Figure B.6

M1 Repair Procedure (Stage #7)

Unlike localized repairs, the depth of the M1 goes to the top of the precast panel.
Although the M1 repairs hold up better than localized repairs, again due to the bridge
deck system not acting compositely, they start separating at the edges and walking spalls
start occurring in front of these repairs.
Two of the seven failures in Tables 2.1 and 3.1 were associated with deteriorating
M1 repairs. On Bridge No. 170085 there was a walking spall, patched with asphalt adja72
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cent to an M1 repair and on Bridge 100332, Span 70, asphalt was used to patch a
deficiency within an existing M1 repair.
B.6

Full Span M1 Repair with Grout Packing
This somewhat modified M1 repair is also used to repair longitudinal spalling

along the edge of a beam. The difference with this repair is that the CIP concrete portion
on top of the precast beams, as well as on top of the beams, is fully removed and
additional steel is added to the area on top of the beams. The fiber board bearing material
is replaced with non-shrink Portland cement grout or epoxy as discussed previously to
provide positive bearing. This repair is extended longitudinally throughout the length of
the span.
The durability of the modified M1 repair and the condition of the deck area
around it depends on the following parameters:
1. Time period between spall, spall repair, and M1 repair,
2. Possible internal damage to the panel induced from previous stages,
3. Possible internal damage to the panel induced from removal of CIP concrete,
4. Bonding between the old concrete and the repair material,
5. Stress redistribution to adjacent areas (after removal of the damaged CIP
concrete that deck region is no longer transferring shear to the supports, so
that shear is redistributed to the transverse edges of the repair),
6. Repair material,
7. Presence of panel shear connectors embedded in the M1 repair,
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8. Time interval between repair and passage of traffic.
9. And finally the most important parameter, removal of the fiberboard and its
replacement by non shrink epoxy.
This procedure is labor intensive, costly and causes interruption to traffic.
However, with the exception of full bridge bay replacement, it is the most effective repair
method because it fills the spalled area under the wheel lines with sound incompressible
material and provides positive bearing for the deck panels. Nevertheless, even these
repairs can end up with deficiencies such as longitudinal cracks within them or adjacent
to them.
None of the failures reported in Tables 2.1 and 3.1 had M1 and grout packing as
the method of repair.
B.7

M2 Repair
Although the M2 repair method was not encountered in any of the authors

inspections or failures listed in Tables 2.1 and 3.1, it deserves to be mentioned because it
was prescribed as a good method of repair by the FDOT in the 1980s [B.3]. The M2
repair, shown in Figure B.7, is used to fix the problem of cracking and spalling along the
transverse joints of the precast panel. The unsound material is removed approximately
six inches on each side of the transverse joint and an inverted T-beam is formed with the
bottom of the precast panel sitting on the flange of the inverted T-beam. The flange of the
T-beam is required to be at least 24 inches wide. The inverted T-beam needs to be
provided with positive bearing on the girders [B.3].
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Figure B.7

M2 Repair Procedure [3]

The M2 repairs are costly relative to other repair methods and cause impact to the
traveling public.
B.8

Full Depth Bay Replacement
Full depth bay replacement is the most effective repair method for deficient

precast deck panel bridges. In fact it is the directive of the DSMO to use this method for
all permanent repairs. At a minimum, it is done in a bay (the transverse distance between
two beams) and throughout the length of the span. Sometimes the entire deck on the span
or all bays is replaced with full depth CIP concrete.
When only a bay is replaced, the CIP concrete and precast panel is demolished,
leaving only the reinforcing steel grid which was within the CIP section for continuity,
then removed using jack hammers. A new bottom steel mat is designed as shown in
Figure B.8 [B.5] and placed as an alternate to the precast panel.
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Figure B.8

Full Depth Bay Replacement Detail

A standard compression test is performed on 6 in. x 12 in. test cylinders at 24
hours, 48 hours, and 72 hours after the concrete is poured and finished. Although there is
always pressure from the public and elected officials, the bridge is not opened to traffic
until the minimum required compressive strength per design calculations is attained.
After the concrete has gained the required strength, the bridge or repaired area is opened
to traffic.
The conventional bay replacement is the most expensive repair method and
causes significant interruption to the traveling public. However, it is the most effective
repair method because it addresses the root cause of the problem which is the elimination
of the vertical and longitudinal separation between the precast deck panel and CIP
surfaces. None of the failures reported in Tables 2.1 and 3.1 occurred on decks which had
been repaired by full depth bay replacement.
It is difficult to apply this method to high ADT highways due to the extended lane
closures required to accommodate concrete curing time. This was the case on Bridge No.
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100436, I-75 over E. Broadway Ave. and CSX Railroad. It is the last recorded failure as
shown in Table 3.1. This was temporarily repaired and shored in September 2007.
Traffic analysis and lane closure calculations indicate that the I-75 in this area can only
have nighttime lane closures due to high ADT conditions.
B.9

References

B.1 Johnson, K, Schultz, A, French, C, Reneson, J., Crack and Concrete Deck Sealant
Performance, NCHRP Report MN/RC 2009-13, March 2009. pp. 74-76.
B.2 Florida Department of Transportation, “FDOT Bridge Maintenance Manual”, p. 33.,
2009 Update.
B.3 Fagundo, F.E., Hays, Jr., C.O., Tabatabai, H., The Effect of Crack Development and
Propagation on the Maintenance Requirement of Precast Deck Bridges, University of
Florida, Gainesville, FL, 1984.
B.4 Parsons Brinckerhoff Design for Florida Department of Transportation. I-75 over
Alafia River Project, Tampa, FL (2000).

77

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Atiq H. Alvi is a graduate from the University of South Florida in 1991, with a
Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering and is professional engineer. He spent eight
years serving at the Florida Department of Transportation, with the final years as District
7 Structures Maintenance Engineer at the District 1 & 7 Structures Maintenance Office.
Atiq spent another eight years at Parsons Brinckerhoff in Tampa, Florida managing the
Bridge Rehabilitation Group. He is presently at TY Lin International in Tampa as
Associate Vice President and Technical Director for Bridge Rehabilitation for the South
Region of the United States. Atiq serves on The Transportation Research Board’s Fiber
Reinforced Polymers Committee, Bridge Life-Cycle Cost Analysis Sub-Committee,
Bridge Aesthetics Sub-Committee and Non-Destructive Testing Sub-Committee.

